

# **FINAL EVALUATION REPORT**

## **EMERGENCY CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT**

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## Introduction and Acknowledgements

The Emergency Capacity Building project is a significant and complex undertaking. With seven major international relief agencies and a decentralized project management unit involved in a planned two-year, \$5.2 million activity focusing on four critical project initiatives, with various cross-agency management and coordination structures, field pilot projects, seven “external” organization partners and over 1800 items of documentation, the Project is a challenge to evaluate – particularly in a relatively short time of approximately six weeks.

The project involves the seven agency Interagency Working Group (IWG) comprised of CARE International, Catholic Relief Services, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, the International Rescue Committee, Oxfam-GB, and World Vision International. In early 2003, the group came together to discuss major gaps in humanitarian response and how to advance more effective delivery of humanitarian assistance by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) through a joint capacity building strategy. Thereafter, a report on emergency capacity was commissioned and based upon many of the findings of that report. In August of 2004, a proposal was submitted to the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation by the IWG.

The primary goal of the proposed ECB Project was *“Improved speed, quality, and effectiveness of the humanitarian community in saving lives, improving the welfare, and protecting the rights of people in emergency situations.”*

To accomplish this goal, the IWG defined four main areas where capacity building was seen as critical: 1) staff capacity development to improve effectiveness in sourcing, developing, and retaining quality staff; 2) accountability and impact measurement, aimed at improving accountability to humanitarian standards in emergencies and better measurement of impact; 3) to improve the agency capacities for emergency preparedness and to reduce risk to disasters, and 4) to enhance resources for field set-up, rapid and reliable ICT, with training for humanitarian field staff.

The intent of the project was, first, to build the capacities of the seven agencies, second, to join with external partners to accomplish the objectives, and third, to influence and strengthen the emergency response of the broader humanitarian community. Funding from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and Microsoft Corporation was approved, and the project began in March 2005.

The Project refined the four capacity building areas into four specific initiatives: Staff Capacity Development (Initiative 1); Accountability and Impact Measurement (Initiative 2); Disaster Risk Reduction (Initiative 3); and Information and Technology Requirements (Initiative 4).

All agencies involved in the project were contacted during the course of the evaluation, and all were most generous with time and information, as were several “partner” organizations.

The methodology used for this evaluation is described in the section on Terms of Reference and Methodology. However, the cooperation and willingness of so many key individuals associated with the Project to help and make themselves available contributed significantly to needed information gathering, document review and the concentration on the specific issues the evaluation was asked to address. With the Project having generated over 150 internal individual contacts and over 350 external individual contacts, that type of assistance was invaluable, helping to focus the interviewing process, as well as other data collection and information gathering.

While it is impossible to acknowledge all of those who have assisted in this intense effort, special recognition must go to Greg Brady, ECB Project Director, and his staff, especially Aziza Abdurazakova, who were always available to answer questions and provide guidance. In addition, all of the agency Focal Points made their own time available and helped the Evaluation Team reach others. We would also like to thank Alex Kobishyn and Doug Pulse at Social Impact, Inc. who assisted in the distribution and compilation of the surveys among other tasks, and Rolf Sartorius, President, Social Impact, Inc. who provided excellent guidance and support for this effort.

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## List of Acronyms

<b>AIM</b>	Accountability and Impact Measurement
<b>ALNAP</b>	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
<b>CARDI</b>	Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute
<b>CARE</b>	International non-government humanitarian organization
<b>CARITAS</b>	Confederation of Catholic relief, development and social service organizations
<b>CRS</b>	Catholic Relief Services
<b>DFID</b>	UK Department for International Development
<b>DRR</b>	Disaster Risk Reduction
<b>ECB</b>	Emergency Capacity Building
<b>EPN</b>	Emergency Personnel Network
<b>HAP-I</b>	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership – International
<b>HPN</b>	Humanitarian Practice Network
<b>ICT</b>	Information and Communications Technology
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Person
<b>IFRC</b>	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
<b>IRC</b>	International Rescue Committee
<b>ISDR</b>	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR)
<b>IT</b>	Information Technology
<b>IWG</b>	Interagency Working Group on Emergency Capacity
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and Evaluation
<b>MOU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>NETHOPE</b>	IT consortium of leading international NGOs
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental Organization
<b>OCHA</b>	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>ODI</b>	Overseas Development Institute
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>OXFAMGB</b>	Development, relief, and campaigning organization
<b>SCF</b>	Save the Children
<b>TOR</b>	Terms of Reference
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNHCR</b>	The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNISDR</b>	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR)
<b>URD</b>	Groupe Urgence Réhabilitation Développement
<b>WVI</b>	World Vision International

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Management of the Emergency Capacity Building Project called for a final evaluation of the Project funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and Microsoft Corporation to assess progress towards its stated goal and outcomes “*to improve the speed, quality and effectiveness of the humanitarian community in saving lives, improving welfare and protecting the rights of people in emergencies.*”

The main objective of the evaluation is to review progress towards project objectives and goals, to inform future endeavors, and to learn. The primary users of the Final Evaluation are the Senior Managers at the IWG agencies, the Interagency Working Group Emergency Directors, project donors, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and Microsoft Corporation, as well as agency staff working on the project.

The evaluation used a mixed methods approach, including interviewing individuals, holding focus group discussions with most agencies, and conducting two field surveys, one to partner organizations and one to field staff. A limitation to the evaluation was less than full access to field perspectives due to time/resource constraints and the practical inability to contact all the key staff and partners, as well as non-IWG contacts involved in the project – there simply were more than time permitted (over 500 persons). However, 93 agency staff, partners and non-IWG agencies and individuals were interviewed or surveyed. Because of the complexity of the project, evaluators were given a greater page limit to address all the points in the Terms of Reference.

If there is a single, basic conclusion to this evaluation of the Emergency Capacity Building project, it is that it was clearly worth undertaking and with strong, continued IWG and donor support, it will contribute significantly to enhanced emergency response capacities in the participating agencies. Further, with a dedicated external effort, it has major potential to improve response capacity in the broader humanitarian community. As one senior observer noted, “it was an idea whose time had come, and if we don’t worry about who takes credit or blame for what, the donors can take a great deal of satisfaction in catalyzing a process that will ultimately benefit many, many people”.

That said, there is an extremely wide range of lessons learned and very well informed views about the strengths and challenges of the ECB Project that should be taken into account in any future Project planning. The Project as originally proposed was visionary in its aims and objectives, as well as in its general emphasis on the importance of emergency preparedness. But in its approved form, it was unrealistic about some of its expectations for accomplishment in such a short timeframe and attempting to accomplish these objectives in a shortened timeframe has taken its toll on staff.

Nevertheless, the Project has, remarkably, accomplished a great deal of what was intended. In doing so, it remains a unique and extremely ambitious effort to unite seven of some of the most responsive emergency and disaster assistance organizations in the

world, in a collaborative effort to improve theirs and the wider humanitarian community's ability to respond to the urgent needs of those affected by severe emergencies and natural disasters. **No comparable effort has been attempted, and it is well worth continuing.**

With coordination - one of the most critical issues in emergency response - (especially in large responses such as the Asian tsunami) not being fully addressed through current systems, efforts to self-organize and collaborate on practices and methodologies must be encouraged. It is precisely because issues involving coordination in times of emergency are so important that efforts such as the ECB Project, which is demonstrating initial success, should continue.

“Lessons learned” from the ECB effort are abundant – and they are both supportive and critical. Realistic and timely expectations are at the top of the list, followed closely by the fact that with some additional committed effort, unprecedented improvements in interagency relationships and trust are possible, usually when based upon an open willingness to share information, plans, and even resources.

But management of a Project of this magnitude, together with its associated procedural and communications networks, must be simplified. Even in a more trusting environment, the best managers in the world can succumb to the sheer weight of process. Clearly, the ECB Project, with its intense internal communications, multiple members, core and agency staff, external partners, and concerns about donor expectations, must avoid the risk of process overtaking substance.

The Chronology of the ECB Project to date is important – as well as interesting. It provides evidence of what is needed to initiate activities in an effort of this complexity; what it takes to maintain that effort, and the importance of assuring continued involvement. That Chronology, in part, is provided in this report.

Also provided are observations on the key elements or factors contributing to the success of the Project thus far, as well as a review of Project strategies and changes that have occurred in project planning and implementation. Some of these changes have simply been necessary as the Project evolved; others, such as the redirection of Initiative 2, have been profound and valuable.

Concentration on the work of the four Project initiatives, particularly over the past 12-15 months, has significantly tempered the Mid Term Review's prediction that “the intended project outputs are largely beyond realization” (in the time remaining). The high number of “products” resulting from the work of Initiative 1, Staff Capacity Development, has provided a series of tools and information that will have increasing usefulness. The already recognized “Good Enough Guide” as well other results from Initiative 2, Accountability and Impact Measurement, are now in use. Even with a slow start, Initiative 3, Disaster Risk Reduction, is finishing this phase of its work with surprising results and field involvement. The promise of Initiative 4, Information and Communications Technology, is being realized, through a comprehensive Information

and Technology and Requirements Assessment, with skills building field training activities currently underway and with an already planned transfer to a sustainable status.

The evaluation team had the opportunity to discuss some of its observations with the team preparing a proposal for a possible Phase II of the ECB Project. Those comments included several major observations that are in this report, especially the fact that the original focus – increasing the individual emergency response capacities of the ECB agencies, and ultimately influencing the capacity of the entire humanitarian response community - remain the primary objective.

Even in a complex array of relationships and process, the ECB Project has the potential to achieve that objective.

**The recommendations that have emerged from this evaluation are presented with the intention of being applicable to a continuation or expansion of ECB activities. They are as follows:**

1. The Interagency Working Group should assure that the continuing focus of the ECB Project is on the enhancement of participating agency emergency response capacity and avoid any perception that the Project is its own organizational entity or an end in itself. This can be achieved by:
  - Minimizing the branding of the name ECB.
  - Maximizing the openness of communications with agencies not involved with ECB by, for example, presenting at workshops, conferences, and by inviting agencies and organizations to events.
  - Hosting a workshop with IWG key agency staff to clarify, identify, and reaffirm goal commitments with the donor, within the agencies, and among agencies.
2. Any continuation of Project activities must be flexible to accommodate changes in planning and implementation. This can be achieved by:
  - Periodic reflection gatherings to review issues and possible changes.
  - Strategic discussions about when the ECB acts as a group or when actions may be appropriate by individual members.
  - Recognizing that there are stages of adaptability and acceptance of ideas and innovations and capitalizing on these processes to more effectively influence the broader humanitarian community. The innovation-decision process includes:
    - knowledge stage (awareness);
    - persuasion stage (advocacy);
    - decision stage - an individual or decision-making unit comes to a point to adopt or reject the innovation (new/better practice);
    - implementation (practical application);
    - confirmation (seeks information for reinforcement of their decision).
3. There must be early attention in any continuation of ECB to define and clarify authorities, terms, indicators of success, decision-making, and roles. This can be

achieved by an initial meeting and one within the first year and/or circulation of documents for comments that would:

- Define organizational change, organizational learning, disaster risk reduction, and other important terminology used by ECB.
  - Clarify decision-making and related authority responsibility.
  - Establish more detailed protocols for dispute resolution.
4. The engagement of external partners such as those organizations with whom ECB has worked – (ALNAP, HAP-I, People In Aid, Nethope, etc.) should become a formalized element of ECB strategy, particularly to assure outreach to the broader humanitarian community and to dispel impressions of exclusivity. This can be accomplished by:
- Inclusion of Partners in Project design and planning.
  - Inclusion of Partners in field implementation activities.
  - Inclusion of Partners in Communication planning.
  - The use of formal agreements or MOUs with Partner Organizations.
  - Deliberative planning to build upon activities of other partners and not create parallel structures.
  - Defining indicators of success for each of the above by hosting a joint session to define these indicators.
5. ECB Project management staff and key agency staff must undertake a more deliberate external communications strategy directed towards awareness raising about emergency capacity and preparedness and sharing of ECB information. The communication strategy should support learning within the Project and learning with external entities. This can be accomplished by:
- Assuring information management at all three critical ECB levels – within IWG agencies, between IWG agencies, and externally.
  - Sponsoring annual low cost “knowledge fairs,” especially in the field (or regionally).
  - Recognizing that there are stages of adaptability, acceptance of ideas, and innovations as well of output of tools (stages of diffusion of innovation - see recommendation 2).
  - Establishing performance indicators for communication activities at all levels.
6. Any planning or design preparation directed towards field implementation activities must include field representation in those processes. This can be accomplished by:
- Engaging the country directors (and regional directors if necessary), agency staff, and any other key stakeholders in planning and design processes for pilots or expansion of projects.
  - Ensuring there is a mechanism for voice from the beneficiaries themselves in the planning to implementation processes, as well as monitoring and evaluation processes. Potential mechanisms can be found in the Clinton NGO Impact Initiative report.

7. ECB management should review personnel employment and assignment procedures to assure transparency and necessary participation. This can be accomplished by:
  - Involving more Agency representatives in the recruitment and interviewing of core project staff.
  - Enhancing the stature and support for the ‘focal point’ function (or a successor position) by giving it more authority in financial and project management decision-making, as well as role transparency.
  
8. Budgeting and funding allocation procedures should be reviewed for more simplified and streamlined approaches. This could be accomplished by:
  - Providing annual (not quarterly) advances of funds to agencies for project management expenses even if this means making an exception to one agency’s established funding mechanism.
  - Early budgeting and agreement on pilot project costs, with full amounts transferred to implementing agencies.
  - Involvement of project management and agency staff in the review of ECB funding procedures, with a view towards revisions that will streamline both ECB and individual agency processes and procedures.
  
9. Assure realistic expectations of time and resources that are needed for project enactment and activities. This can be accomplished by:
  - Initial face-to-face meetings with initiative/objective teams whereby direction, activities, and indicators are mapped out more concretely.
  - Providing for reflection points at periodic stages in project implementation to address issues, modify objectives, and revise activities and workloads if necessary.
  - Allowing flexibility if agency or staff cannot commit to an activity or certain timeline because of other pressures.
  
10. For continued ECB activities, clearly define measurable outcomes and indicators for the overall goal and objectives as well as for each individual agency in terms of their improved capacity to prepare for and respond to emergencies. Refine these goals and objectives to obtainable levels. This can be achieved by:
  - Holding an initial strategic workshop with principals and operational staff to define goal(s) and objectives.
  - For agency indicators, use examples from the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria for evaluation, defining quality, effectiveness, efficiency, coordination, relevance, impact of response, and sustainability as possible means to measure overall impact in emergency responses.
  - Draw upon Sphere Project guidance, UNHCR indicators, and other such examples of standards and indicators for overall organization performance in emergencies.
  - Draw upon the work of public and private entities who may have established objectives for areas such as collaboration, partnership, and mentoring.

## Terms of Reference and Methodology

The main objective of this evaluation is, within the Terms of Reference provided, to review progress towards project objectives and goals, to inform future endeavors, and to learn. The primary users of the Final Evaluation are the Senior Managers at the IWG agencies, the Interagency Working Group Emergency Directors, project donors, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and Microsoft Corporation, as well as agency staff working on the project.

The evaluation used a mixed methods approach of documentation review, interviewing individuals, holding focus group discussions with most agencies and across one initiative, and conducting two field surveys, one to partners and one to the field. A limitation of the evaluation was a lack of full access to field perspectives due to time/resource constraints. While a wide range of individuals were contacted (see below) the evaluators faced the practical inability to contact all key staff, partners, and non-IWG contacts involved in the project since there were more than time permitted (over 500 persons). The Project was also heavily process oriented with a drive also towards developing products, thus the mixed methods approach worked best to learn about processes and outcomes.

Under contract from ECB Management, Social Impact provided a team of two consultants to conduct the final evaluation. The methodology employed closely followed the direction outlined in the Terms of Reference (TOR), which appear in Appendix I. The team was also guided by the list of questions in the TOR dealing with project process and management, agency achievements towards the plan, the organizational learning process, partnerships and collaboration, and external contributions.

The evaluation was conducted from early May until mid-June, 2007. Travel to Atlanta, Baltimore, Oxford and London were undertaken to maximize input from agencies that did not have representation in the Washington, DC metro area. The primary methods employed for the review included:

### ***Project documentation review:***

The evaluators reviewed nearly 100 documents (listed in Appendix II), which are a subset of the over 1800 documents on the well-documented ECB internal SharePoint website. The documents provide information on governance and financial systems, proposal and implementation plans, the midterm and other major reports, key meetings and workshops over the life of the project, the communications plan, external website documents, key outputs from the project, as well as knowledge fair materials. ECB management and individual initiative managers also made available key documents for review. This extensive documentation provided an excellent basis for understanding the project, its processes, and outputs. The evaluators did not have to go far to find documents in the short time available.

The evaluators also reviewed and updated the 15 page Project LogFrame with goals, objectives, and indicators and commented on progress towards objectives (Appendix III).

Due to the complexity and multiple aspects of this project, there are some inconsistencies between the narrative portion of the implementation plan and the individual items listed in the logical framework, sometimes confusing outcomes and results. While sometimes difficult to analyze, these inconsistencies do not affect overall project achievements.

***Interviews with key project actors:***

A set of guiding questions was prepared for interviews each with ECB Project staff, the IWG agencies, donors, and external actors. Inquiries were based around the main questions in the TOR with additional probing questions added as needed. They included questions that address a peer review of the project.

IWG agencies provided lists of key personnel to interview. The evaluation team made every attempt to interview a wide range of ECB Project staff and IWG agency staff who play significant roles in the ECB Project, including IWG principals (eight out of nine or 8/9), all seven focal points, an additional core group of agency staff ranging from 5-7 per agency and across initiatives, and a core number of staff from each initiative (ECB1: 12/35, ECB2: 10/32, ECB3: 9/35, ECB 4: 4/8). Given time constraints and the large number of persons involved, the team was understandably limited in actual number of staff interviewed. However, nearly all ECB Project management staff were interviewed (11 out of 15), including some who left the project. In total, at least 93 agency staff, partners, and non-IWG agencies and individuals were interviewed.

***Key partners interacting with the ECB Project:***

The main partners with whom the ECB Project has worked were interviewed either by phone, face-to-face, or via survey. Some partner involvement has been substantial, as in the cases of HAP-I, People In Aid, and NetHope, while other collaborative efforts have been either initiated more recently or involvement has been nominal. Partners were asked about the process of relationships with the ECB Project, their contributions to the Project, and gains from working on this endeavor, in addition to details about how the partnership alliance worked (see details below).

***Partnership and field surveys:***

The team developed and pilot tested two surveys. One was based on partnerships and collaboration within the IWG agencies and between the IWG agencies, partners, and ECB Management. The second survey focused on field activities, particularly covering the disaster risk reduction initiative.

The partnership survey had a two-fold objective: Part I of the survey asked respondents questions about experience in ECB, including benefits for their organization, while Part II

questions probed details about their views of the partnering process. (This second part of the survey is drawn from a partnership assessment tool developed by Leeds.<sup>1</sup>)

The partnership survey was sent to 70 persons, including a heavy emphasis on those implementing Project activities in the field, resulting in a 30% response rate. Results from the survey are noted in the report, while further details can be found in Appendix V. The field survey (focus on the Disaster Risk Reduction initiative) was sent to a smaller number of individuals in an effort to try to reach as many persons who are working on (pilot) field activities. The response rate about 45%, however numerous email addresses were inoperative. Results are likewise accounted for in the report.

While the Evaluation Team had hoped to interview field beneficiaries of ECB Project activities, it was not possible to contact direct beneficiaries due to a lack of time and detailed beneficiary identification information.

***Interviews with external actors and partners:***

While there were over 350 external contacts listed on the SharePoint website, the team contacted those key external contacts who could provide a sense of the accomplishments of the Project's third objective - to achieve changes/improvements in the broader humanitarian sector. Questions centered around their knowledge and experience with the Emergency Capacity Building Project, their knowledge of, exposure to, and/or use of some of the tools and papers, trainings, and other outputs generated from the Project, and any evidence of the ECB Project having impact on the broader humanitarian sector.

The team also interviewed a representative of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

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<sup>1</sup> Assessing Strategic Partnership The Partnership Assessment Tool. (2003) The Strategic Partnership Taskforce in the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister in conjunction with the Nuffield Institute at the University of Leeds, Leeds, UK.

## **ECB Project Chronology**

In many respects, the ECB Project is defined by its milestones and events. Significant among these are key events and actions that have influenced its initial concept; those that have been the basis for management and implementation planning; those that have driven process requirements or needed changes; and those that have affected project outcomes to date (see Chart below).

With seven participating agencies, various Partner organizations, and a central staff, all focused on using ECB Project resources to enhance emergency response capacity, it is not surprising that the number of such events and actions is quite large. Some are of obvious importance, such as the initial decision of the IWG to pursue the ECB approach and to seek support from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to do so. Others are less obvious but of significant importance, such as the initial project start-up workshop in Washington DC in April 2005, or the 6 day meeting of the Accountability and Impact Measurement Initiative (Initiative Two) team in Nairobi in February 2006 during which the participants recognized that a complete review and revision of planning and anticipated activities was in order.

The balance of 2005 saw the organization and beginning of all Initiative activities, as well as the initial planning for pilot field projects in Indonesia, Ethiopia and Guatemala, the initiation of the Metrics Study, the Retention Study by People In Aid, and the beginning of the Information and Communications Technology (Initiative Four) Assessment Report.

Midway through the Project, the revised Project Implementation Plan of May 2006, and the May 2006 Mid Term Review provided updated guidance and direction for managing the remainder of the Project, based upon the experiences and lessons learned to date.

Later in 2006 the completion of the Good Enough Guide, which was published in February 2007, marked a special highlight in Accountability Initiative work (Initiative Two). Similarly, the Staff Capacity Development Initiative (Initiative One), established with People In Aid, published and posted some of the numerous pieces that were being developed (June 2006). Commencement of the pilot projects in three countries in late 2006 was a milestone for the Disaster Risk Reduction Initiative (Initiative Three).

In April 2007, the ECB Learning Event was a special milestone, presenting the full range of ECB activities to all IWG agency and partner attendees, including senior staff and executives. For some in the Project, this was the first time to see the work as a whole.

Understanding the ECB Project and its accomplishments requires recognition of the significance of these events and the importance of the processes and management attention that was necessary for their occurrence; they are evidence of the core collaborative goals that characterize this effort.

As required by the Terms of Reference, a detailed listing of the significant events and actions that make up the ECB chronology to date is presented in Appendix IV. In addition, Table 1 below highlights some key milestones of the ECB Project.

**Table 1. Key ECB Project Milestones**

Creation of Interagency Working Group (IWG)															
Report on Emergency Capacity		ECB Grant Proposal		ECB Project Start-up Workshop		Metrics Study		ECB4 Assessment: IT Requirements		Retention Study		ECB2 Meeting: Nairobi			
Guatemala Information Center Pilot				National Staff Development Pilot				Publication of Good Enough Guide				Learning Event: Disaster Risk Reduction			
ECB Project Learning Event				Final Evaluation of ECB Project											
1	1	2	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	
2003		2004		2005				2006				2007			

## Achievements Toward Goals, Objectives and Outcomes

### A. *Conditions Affecting Project Achievements*

In hindsight, it is clear that many of the Emergency Capacity Building Project's original objectives and planned outcomes were overly ambitious. However, its results to date, given the time allocated, are significant.

In May 2006, over one year into the project, the project implementation plan was modified for the second time since the submission of the project proposal (the first plan was significantly different from the proposal). While revisions were based on meetings by members of each of the initiatives, the IWG, and Project management staff, the resulting logical framework was extensive, and managers were still working with a five year concept that had been compressed into two years with half the money originally planned.

Even with these difficulties, member agencies (with perhaps one exception) fully agree that the Project is aligned with their interests, and they are firm in their long-term commitment to continued Project involvement. Early examples of changes in practice, revised emergency response strategies, and adoption and use of ECB outputs and tools already exist. Within participating agencies, it is recognized that awareness of opportunities presented by the Project will require expansion beyond the immediate staff and management personnel involved in the ECB Project, and as was observed at the April 2007 Learning Event (a global presentation and sharing of initiatives' progress and outcomes with IWG agencies, donors, and Agency CEOs), that process is underway.

Regardless of the collapsed timeframe, the project has clearly accomplished many, if not most, of its overall project objectives. It must be emphasized that accomplishing so many objectives that were intended for a five-year time frame in a two and half-year period is remarkable. However, it also speaks to the price of those achievements - the "burn-out" factor among several of those working on the Project.

While the overall accomplishments of the Project are discussed here, details of the results and outcomes in individual initiatives are presented under each initiative finding. In addition, Appendix III presents the current updates to each element of the revised logical framework.

### B. *Progress Towards Achievement of Overall Outcomes<sup>2</sup>*

**Initiative One:** *Improved agency effectiveness in building and maintaining staff capacity for humanitarian action.*

For the first overall outcome of this initiative, *agency preparedness to respond faster in emergencies and provide higher quality responses with better trained and more rapidly*

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<sup>2</sup> These overall outcomes are taken from the Logframe Appendix to the Revised Implementation Plan.

*deployed staff*, some agencies are progressing towards systematically measuring and monitoring their capacity, and there are initial indications that agencies' country offices are better prepared to deliver quality work in emergencies. For example, agencies report increased numbers of staff in key emergency positions, including some agencies reporting that their global emergency response team is increasing in numbers as well as capacities. At least two agencies reported improved timeliness in response to recent emergencies as well as improvements in country-level emergency preparedness plans; and several agencies believe the Metrics Pilot Project management tools will improve accuracy in reporting of key indicators.

The second expected outcome of this initiative, *increased evidence of adoption of improved HR management practices by all IWG agencies and by other humanitarian organizations*, was measured by agency self-reports and peer review. In discussions with senior level management within agencies, they noted a rise in awareness of staff capacity needs and issues for emergencies and willingness to increase their agencies' readiness to adopt improved practices. Examples of these changes reported by individual agencies include:

- New level of awareness and commitment to measure how well the agency sources, develops, and retains staff.
- Due to greater awareness of emergency needs, a new staff development director was appointed.
- Realization that Accountability and Impact Measurement (AIM) must be a part of staff orientation in order to mainstream it throughout the organization.
- Changes in strategies and direction have occurred such as an emphasis on national staff development and use of Metric tools to measure impact in emergencies.
- Review of HR practices and procedures and identification of HR practices that need strengthening in order to support emergency staffing.
- Development of an abridged version of an Employee Manual based on ECB learning.

For the third outcome of this initiative, *increased internal and external funding for staff capacity management activities*, there is strong evidence indicating accomplishment of this outcome. All agencies committed significant staff time as well as resources to this initiative (although dollar amounts were more difficult to ascertain). Three agencies created a post for director of organizational learning (or similar title), while two agencies appointed a staff wellness manager. With regard to external funding, McKinsey & Company donated a pro-bono consultancy valued at one million dollars. While there was no other evidence of external funding, the evaluators found that the McKinsey donation was an important contribution to this initiative, being a highly credible and well-recognized leader in this field. Additionally, the internal funding commitments have been significant and will undoubtedly add to the improvement of staff capacities and staffing levels in future emergencies.

## **Initiative Two**

The overall outcomes of AIM were modified in the revised implementation plan for the two-year period. They included: *IWG agencies establish interagency processes that strengthen accountability and impact measurement capacities at the field level and development of a “how to” guide to support accountability and impact measurement practice.*

These objectives for Initiative Two have been met. IWG agencies and partners agreed upon a “good enough” approach, and a guide was developed, published, and is being widely disseminated – in at least two of the agencies, more than 2000 copies of the Guide have been ordered to date (see Findings Initiative 2). Trainings have been developed around the Guide for most agencies, and the Guide has been integrated in some of the IWG agency manuals. Training of the standing team members on the training modules is planned for 2007.

A standing team of M&E ‘experts’ was developed, and members of that team were deployed to Niger and Guatemala to build skills on AIM.

Of the four initiatives, Initiative Two has spent perhaps the most time in cultivating external relationships with partners. While there were some initial concerns about mission overlap, it now appears that development of these relationships has been fruitful and appreciated by both the IWG agencies as well as the partners.

## **Initiative Three**

This initiative expected three primary outcomes: *that IWG agencies will implement a promising community-based DRR project in at least 3 pilot countries and disseminate results widely; that target communities in those pilot countries will be better prepared to respond effectively to disasters; and that local or national authorities in the pilot countries and/or at least one academic institution will be more aware of DRR principles.*

DRR projects in three countries resulted in promising practices (as identified by agencies) and were implemented with the involvement of five of the seven agencies. These projects also engaged a wide variety of organizations and networks (such as Red Cross, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and other UN agencies, CARITAS, CARDI, and others).

A DRR handbook was prepared and placed on the internal and public ECB website, as well as disseminated widely in Ethiopia. The report of the DRR pilot project better practices was recently drafted (during the course of this evaluation) but is not yet in print. Agencies reported that those who attended trainings were also involved in planning, preparing, or updating emergency preparedness plans for their communities.

Greater awareness of DRR principles was evidenced by reports from the field and from surveys, but it was evident at the headquarters level as well where agencies have elevated

its importance in programming design and protocols. In Guatemala, IWG agencies are collaborating with all levels of government officials to develop or revise DRR policies, including the successful lobbying for local officials to update their emergency response plans and to coordinate with community-based emergency preparedness committees. The ability and power that seven agencies have to advocate for policy and program change, particularly at the field level, cannot be understated. This is perhaps an under-valued aspect of the project.

These are important achievements for this initiative, even though the work was started nearly one year into the ECB Project, and even though the initial number of involved communities is small.

### **Initiative Four**

The stated outcomes of this initiative as they appear in the logframe are: *to improve information communication technology support to humanitarian action via increasing IWG agency internal coherence in understanding the challenges faced in IT and its requirements and improved links between IT and humanitarian assistance departments*, have been achieved in part but do not recognize other significant outcomes that have contributed to the success of the initiative.

These outcomes include a well-researched and written assessment report on Information and Technology Requirements and the initiation of the ICT Skills Building Program. Both activities have had significant impact on achieving the overall results expected in this Initiative. In addition, Initiative Four involvement in the Metrics Project, the Guatemala Information Center, the Emergency Response ICT Resources Center, and its development of the Project's SharePoint website, is further evidence of its success.

The Findings section of this report provides additional information on these activities.

While the evaluation found increased collaboration between IT and Emergency departments and increases in awareness of IT issues and needs (including an increase in IT staff involved in emergency responses), there is still room for improvement in mutual understanding of program and IT needs. However, the availability of the Assessment and the initiation of the Skills Building Program will help to improve these understandings.

The integration of this initiative's activities with NetHope, the primary partner, has been a critical factor in its success. NetHope has established an Emergency Response Working Group, and while it was not initiated as a formal objective of this Project, NetHope's involvement as a partner provides instant visibility for the Project's better practices in IT. With 18 NGO member agencies and a growing network of local chapters, its outreach to the humanitarian community and its ability to disseminate information and results is considerable.

NetHope will be taking over some aspects of the follow-up to this initiative of the ECB Project and will further expand its outreach to improve capacities at the field level. While

the full potential of impact at the field level has not yet been reached (capacity building and funds for IT capacity training will be needed), the overall outcomes of this initiative have been achieved.

### *C. Achievements in Partnership and Collaboration*

It is obvious that the ECB Project has supported and has been supported by the collaborative effort of IWG agencies. In fact, there is widespread belief that success to date (and most believe there has been success) has been based more upon the collaborative relationships that have developed among agency partners because of ECB, rather than trying to judge the success of the project against specific, measurable outcomes at this time.

These increased collaborative relationships are evident in all four Initiatives, and several participants particularly cited instances of such improved relationships in field settings. Others commented that these improved relationships should really be the acknowledged basis upon which ECB can be used to improve emergency capacity both within participating agencies and the broader humanitarian community.

Collaboration within the Project has taken a number of different forms - from feeling more comfortable sharing internal documents (such as recruitment information or start-up procedures in emergencies) to agencies spontaneously working together to develop a response to emergencies (Joja Indonesia earthquake 2006).

While the Project's governance structure, as such, was not necessarily seen as inhibiting partnership arrangements, the "top-down" design of the project was seen as contributing to delayed field involvement. Despite this concern, most of those contacted also agreed that a large, multiple agency undertaking of this type almost had to "start at the top," or at least at headquarters, with late field involvement the price to be paid.

## Key Factors or Elements of Success

Partnership concepts and a clear understanding of those concepts appear to be critical elements in the ultimate success of the ECB. To test this assumption, a partnership survey was sent to 60 ECB agency personnel working both at headquarters and in the field, and to personnel of 10 partners. (Tallied responses to the survey can be found in Appendix V). Nearly all those from partner organizations responded to the survey, and the overall response rate from others was between 32-35%. Much of what was garnered in personal interviews, phone calls, and focus group discussion was corroborated by survey results.

For example, there was strong agreement (>65% of respondents) with:

- The statement that their agency has experienced closer coordination and relationships with IWG agencies as a result of the ECB, and with
- The belief that mutual learning had occurred.

(See Figure 1 below)

Even an IWG principal noted after reviewing the work and outputs of ECB that “we share in a way that is unprecedented!”

The following elements were also strongly mentioned as important successes among respondents:

- Relationships and trust building;
- Tools developed; and
- Increased accountability.

For ECB ‘partner’ organizations, (that is, non IWG members), interactions with the project brought slightly different benefits. Most noted the professional enjoyment of being involved with the ECB Project and the fact that it brought new thinking, stimulated the production of quality, relevant resources to the sector, and for some, brought heightened credibility to their organizations. This developed, however, after some partners initially were uncertain if ECB Project activities would duplicate or parallel their own. However, as the ECB Project direction became clearer and relationships were established, a shared understanding of roles and joint contributions developed as well.

Collaboration and partnering at the field level is still nascent, particularly as field activities have only been undertaken in the last 9-12 months. Field staff are now a driving force behind collaboration. Despite a late start, just a few examples of collaboration and partnering across all four initiatives include:


- A National staff capacity building training undertaken in Pakistan in June 2007 which included government officials and Red Cross staff.
- Joint assessment and joint responses to the West Sumatra earthquake in Indonesia, joint evaluations undertaken after the tsunami, and interagency standing team work.
- Partnering with local NGOs in Indonesia for the Disaster Risk Reduction study.

- ICT skills training at the national level and the development by NetHope of local NGO chapters.
- Cross-sharing of agency tools, kits, and methods used in the field (as well as headquarters) occurred throughout the Project tenure.
- Joint exchange field visits (peer review and skills building).
- Inclusion of multiple partners and organizations in Ethiopia, Guatemala, and Indonesia for the disaster risk reduction pilot studies and wide collaboration on writing the workshop handbook on DRR.
- Development of IT coordination space for emergency response for any agency in the Guatemala Collaboration Platform.

This is a non-exhaustive list, and many more examples of collaboration and partnering have occurred at the field level.

### *Partnership Survey Results*

**Figure 1.**



*The partnership survey asked about views on the partnering process in detail, with respondents requested to rank the key strengths and benefits of the ECB Project.*

There were clear trends<sup>3</sup> in improvement over the two-year project duration among the following perceptions of partnering elements and processes:

- The **recognition and acceptance of the need for partnership**, that is, the reason why each partner is engaged in the partnership, improved;
- The development of a **common vision** where agencies and entities working with the ECB Project have a clear vision of the project, shared values, and joint aims and objectives, was more strongly recognized;
- The project had ensured a **meaningful sense of commitment** to its goals and objectives for the IWG members and partner organizations;
- The fact that the ECB partnership **fosters trust within the IWG members and with ECB partner organizations** was rated highly; and
- The perception that the Project has set in place good arrangements to ensure that partnership aims, objectives, and working arrangements are reconsidered and,

<sup>3</sup> i.e., responses shifted from answers of 1, 2 (strongly disagree) to 4, and 5 (strongly agree)


where necessary, revised in the light of monitoring and review findings, improved (**learning**).

This recognition of the need for partnership reflected what one senior official said (as previously noted), that ECB was a “project whose time had come.” Agencies realized they had the same issues and that all shared a vital mission of improving emergency response. Coordination is one of the most serious issues in emergency response and especially in large responses such as the Asian tsunami or the South Asia earthquake, and the international community has not successfully addressed this issue through current systems. Therefore, efforts to self organize and collaborate on practices, methodologies, and systems is needed and should be encouraged. It is precisely because the many issues that surround effective, timely emergency response have existed for decades, that efforts such as the ECB Project, which is making progress in this regard, should continue and be a basis for solution.

Many of those interviewed emphasized repeatedly the value of the increased awareness about emergency response capacity resulting from ECB, citing new awareness about the importance of disaster risk reduction and the practical advantages of collaborative HQ and field processes. In the survey, 70% of respondents agreed that the ECB Project was well aligned with their organization's response activities. Somewhat fewer (60%) stated that their participation in ECB led to improvements in their own capacities. These statistics reflect not only IWG agencies, but also partners who were directly engaged with the ECB Project.

With regard to participation in ECB furthering organizational capacity to support emergency response, 43% said that it did to a moderate degree, whereas slightly more (47%) said to some extent (see Figure 2). Areas where organizations did note change included: bringing accountability into stronger focus in operations; bringing greater clarity to disaster risk reduction and having that approach incorporated into strategies; understanding better as an organization the meaning of emergency preparedness planning; broader agency use of ECB products for more agency-wide capacity development efforts; and, as mentioned before, integration of key ECB elements into revised emergency strategies.

**Figure 2.**



*There was strong agreement that being involved in the ECB Project has improved their organizations' capacity to respond to emergencies.*

***“Our emergency team is better prepared now than before the ECB Project started.”***

Agencies still feel strongly committed to the process and enthusiasm for the work remains very high, despite heavy workloads and some clear signs of “burn out.”

## Review and Analysis of Key ECB Strategies and Changes

Strategies for the planning and implementation of the ECB Project were premised on (1) the need for improvement in IWG member capacity to respond to emergencies; (2) the belief that strong donor support would be the catalyst for significant joint and coordinated improvement activities; (3) the conviction that these seven agencies could overcome differences and work together on improved emergency response capacity; and (4) the assumption that these agencies working together would ultimately influence and improve the broader capability of the “humanitarian community” to do the same.

To a large degree, these premises were, and continue to be valid.

There is widespread agreement that the ECB Project, as approved and described in the original proposal and implementation plan, was far too ambitious for a two-year period. While the project’s objectives and anticipated outcomes may have been appropriate for a five-year activity, many were unrealistic for a two-year project.

### *Management Challenges*

As the Mid Term Review observed, the original proposal was for five years; but when the Project was approved, it was reduced to two years with an approval for half the budget requested. Still, the five-year goals and objectives remained intact as well as the initial three specific Initiatives. These factors, plus the understandable management challenges resulting from the time required to launch a project with the complexity of the ECB, created an immediate early environment of “catch up.” In fact, the May 2006 Mid Term Review noted, “with a duration of only two years, the intended project outputs are largely beyond realization.” The Mid Term Review also mentioned that “research asserts that a duration of 3-5 years is necessary to achieve sustainable organizational development results.”

Several participants have also commented that there was an underestimation of the management challenges involved in the project. Many activities took several months to initiate; participating agencies and project management staff needed more time than anticipated to establish working relationships and Initiative management procedures; field participation came later than most believed it should. However, there is also widespread recognition of the complexity of the Project, with its multiple participants and necessary procedures, and most view the management challenges that have faced the project as well managed by the Project Director. A prevailing belief is that dealing with those challenges was essential and that the process of doing so has been a valuable learning experience for the future.

One agency noted that, at least for the accountability initiative, ECB acted as a ‘force-multiplier’ *“with an aligned Emergency Strategy it meant that, rather than being an additional workload, the ECB Project actually multiplied resources (both human, mainly Initiative 2 staff and Advisers, and financial) that support implementation of the quality and accountability components of our agency’s Emergency Strategy. We were thus able*

*to make much more significant advances in our strategy than we would have been able to do on our own.”* Many noted that the learning across agencies also acted as a force-multiplier.

### *Goal Alignment*

The ambitious nature of the goal and its corresponding objectives and activities to attain that goal were not closely aligned. Alignment of the goal and major objectives with activities would have yielded clear result gains. The project would have benefited from clearer definitions of key concepts such as organizational learning, organizational change, and partnerships. With a common understanding of the mechanics of these complex processes, more strategic activities with their corresponding process and outcome indicators could be developed.

Overall, the model worked. One person noted, “it worked like a seven-legged race, but we made it to the finish line.” With complex systems addressing complex issues, the expectation that the first design of the ECB implementation model was going to work was unrealistic. In the future, it will be more realistic to build into the strategy the flexibility required to respond to the need for changes, new directions, and ways to measure the change. The ECB Project did use some opportunities to modify the strategy - primarily from the proposal to the first Implementation Plan, and then to a more limited extent, from the first Implementation Plan to the Revised Implementation Plan of May 2006. Also, individual initiatives, changed activities, and directions where they appeared needed, particularly Initiatives 2 and 3. While this did not change all expectations of accomplishments, it did demonstrate that flexibility in implementation can still contribute to an original strategy.

Additionally, in areas where the logframe objectives and indicators did not go into detail on measurement, such as in the areas of collaboration, relationship building, and partnering, the project has exceeded initial expectations. Logframes are a good tool to measure project achievements; however, they are limited in flexibility and in measuring intangible or “spin off” effects. Measurement of these collaboration and partnering objectives and spin off effects have been captured in a retrospective partnership survey undertaken by the evaluators, looking at changes from the beginning of the project until now. Again, it needs to be reiterated that this was a formative evaluation, not summative, in that a number of activities were still underway while the evaluation took place.

### *Logframe Changes*

The logframe changes since May 2006 are nominal.<sup>4</sup> Where changes have been made, project indicators added or deleted are noted in the Appendix IV – Logframe Review. Discussions about achievement of objectives is found under the Findings Section, and the December logframe was updated with additional achievements the evaluators were able to find to date. Needless to say, not all achievements will have been captured as a number

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<sup>4</sup> ECB 1 dropped three activities under the result 1.2 New and improved approaches to building staff capacity developed and piloted; ECB 4 added an Outcome level indicator and monitoring indicators in results 4.1 and 4.3.

of activities are being undertaken as of this writing and others are still planned until December (particularly in the ICT Skills Building activity in Initiative 4).

#### *Project Approach - Four Phases*

The Project was designed to have a phased approach to implementation – beginning with discovery, information and knowledge sharing, then identification of good practices/prototypes, the subsequent piloting of these good pilots/prototypes, and finally integrating these good practices, scaling up, and institutionalizing knowledge. This approach to implementation is sound particularly if given the necessary time to carry it out. Therein lies the challenge – and ECB experienced a truncated implementation period.

A number of the pilot project activities were still underway in late May and June 2007<sup>5</sup> for three of the four initiatives, and the integration of the practices, scaling-up, and institutionalization of the knowledge learned has for the most part not yet occurred in a significant way. The exceptions are in some areas of the first initiative (regarding staffing practices, changes in hiring and recruitment procedures) and the accountability initiative (designing training and getting the guide into procedural operations). For disaster risk reduction, agencies have reported moving this up as a priority and some have taken further action steps to include it in proposals and programming. For the fourth initiative, the assessment has been used to review policies, procedures, and capacity needs with the Skills Building Program beginning actual field involvement. Scaling up of pilot projects and institutionalization of knowledge will require, by necessity, more time to accomplish.

#### *External Contributions – ECB Benefits Beyond IWG Membership*

An ultimate expectation for the ECB Project is expressed in its intent to influence and engage the broader humanitarian community. A stated goal is “*to improve the speed, quality and effectiveness of the **Humanitarian Community** in saving lives, improving welfare and protecting the rights of people in emergencies.*”

Achieving this ambitious goal clearly requires far more time than the two years thus far devoted to the ECB Project. It also presents challenges in terms of measuring impact and results. (Making judgments about the “speed, quality and effectiveness of the humanitarian community” is a difficult task).

Setting aside measurement difficulties, making available to the broader humanitarian community the outputs, tools and information resulting from the ECB project is inherently a good thing to do, and many examples such as the Sphere Project, the Clinton NGO Impact initiative, and others already exist. Further, with IWG agencies making up a significant part of the US and international response to emergencies, there is a view among these agencies that a coordinated effort on their part will inevitably influence the broader community.

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<sup>5</sup> A request to the donors for a no-cost extension until December 2007 was in process as of this writing.

But there appear to have been some lost opportunities in communicating processes and outputs to the broader communities. External observers have been interested in the processes as well as the outputs - what learning could do for them and how increased collaboration and relationship building could be of value. It should be noted that many of these tangible 'outputs' were finalized well into the project or close to the end of project, making sharing of them seemingly delayed. All but one of the persons contacted outside of the IWG group knew about ECB in general and had seen or used one of its outputs/products. However, they all expressed the desire and interest to be more engaged in the process of ECB as well.

For example, several of those not directly involved in the Project who have benefited from ECB outputs maintained that if the Project claims as some of its greatest successes the improved relationships, collaboration, and trust that has resulted, then why not extend those desirable attributes to non-ECB organizations? They note that while reading a guide or using a tool may be useful, it will not capture those important processes.

Others expressed the view (and some frustration) that the IWG could have included more members. However, they appear to be unaware of the basis upon which the IWG was formulated and the rationale for staying with the seven agencies. Had this rationale been more widely explained, and why it was important to work within a manageable number of agencies, it may have been better accepted.

Also, many of the "outside" perceptions about the Project (many of which are inaccurate) *may* have been dispelled with more frequent and consistent (voice) communications and periodic updates at major meetings and forums; however, initial perceptions were a challenge to counteract. In one such forum in Rome, the ECB Project did receive comments from external groups about the inclusiveness of the IWG efforts and a genuine interest and desire to be a part of the ECB learning process.

One outside observer summed it up: "I don't think they (ECB) are trying to be secretive – but they should just be honest about what they were attempting to do – their focus is first to develop their own capacity to improve emergency response. But since they are promoting accountability and transparency, they should follow their own model."

Despite the perceptions that ECB has been somewhat closed, there have been numerous ECB activities that included other agencies as well as dissemination of key documents and tools that the Project has developed. Nearly all of the studies, documents, and publications that the ECB Project as a whole has developed are on the ECB website open to the public. At InterAction, two working groups have started as a result of or stimulated by ECB activities - an accountability group and a disaster risk reduction working group. One agency committed funds to send staff to an ECB training in Nairobi, believing the importance of it would be useful. The ODI/HPN paper, "Understanding and Addressing Staff Turnover in Humanitarian Agencies" (published June 2006), and the Initiative 4 Technology Assessment report (March 2006) have seen a significant number of downloads from both the ODI website and the ECB Project website.

However, the notion that information is shared widely simply by posting documents on a website may be inadequate, especially when dealing with the international NGO community – many of whom require, or at least demand, direct attention. An outward looking strategy may be useful and could be employed even in the last weeks of the Project. If there is a second phase of ECB, it should create an explicit part of the plan, with indicators of success outlined, to seek the involvement of the broader community.

How ECB did have an impact was showing that a network of agencies can work together on common problems and produce useful results for the broader humanitarian community. The Project has produced useful products and shared most of those documents via their website and other partners' websites. These are a first step to increasing the awareness and knowledge about some key issues. The innovation-decision process to bring these ideas into broader practice involves many more steps/stages such as the persuasion stage (advocacy), the decision stage (where an individual or decision-making unit comes to a point to adopt or reject the innovation or new/better practice), then actual implementation (practical application), and finally confirmation (where an agency or decision-making unit seeks information for reinforcement of their decision).

At this point in time however, as many external responders would concur, it is too soon to tell if there are other lasting ECB impacts on the larger humanitarian community.

### ***Organizational Learning and Change - Process***

#### *Governance*

The IWG initially set about establishing governance with legal and financial mechanisms, systems to label documents to put online, conflict resolution methods, and other procedural matters. These were put in place within the first six months of Project operations. They were established to the best knowledge of the IWG at the time.

As the Project evolved, new and sometimes unanticipated issues arose necessitating a revision or addition to the initial model. Some issues were dealt with on an ad hoc basis. However, one area in which respondents desired more proactive modifications to governance was around decision-making authority for each role of staff in the Project and for Focal Points.

While many have noted that governance procedures were cumbersome, adding time to workloads already overstretched, they also admitted they were probably what was necessary to build trust among the agencies. Others have noted the need to streamline these mechanisms for a second phase of the Project. Surely for some, the governance structures were not clear, and improved communication may have remedied the problem. (The partnership survey showed strong trends in people having improved understanding or perceptions that the governance agreements were clearer over time).

Project staff, for the most part, kept the project running, although the momentum was not always consistent across initiatives. For instance, the disaster risk reduction initiative

required a more forceful management from the Project Manager and Focal Points to bring it on track.

Most also agreed that field participation could have been expedited with a far more streamlined review and approval procedure from project management for funding sub projects. Emergency Departments in many of the agencies felt they needed strengthening before they could assist or further develop their agencies' field offices' capacities to better respond to emergencies. They also felt that collaboration among agencies needed to happen with tacit agreement from headquarters so that field offices could likewise feel free to collaborate with other agencies. In fact, agencies felt one of their biggest lessons was that trust or collaboration could not be imposed vertically or even horizontally across organizations.

#### *Agency changes and learning*

There are mixed reactions to how much ECB has, in actuality at this point, contributed to documented or identifiable changes in procedures or policies dealing with emergency preparedness and capacity within the seven agencies. Several interviewees pointed out that there never was a working definition of "organizational change," and attempts to document change without meaningful definitions or benchmarks is difficult. Many others, particularly those in larger IWG agencies, repeatedly noted that expectations for serious or significant organizational change in a short time frame of two years are unrealistic. However, these same individuals believed that such changes could and would occur over a longer, sustained period of effort.

In the context of the ECB organizational learning process, the project's initiation within the emergency unit and outgrowth to human resources (HR) and IT units/departments occurred because of the nature of the work in each initiative. By Project design, the intention was to have the Focal Point be a senior person to influence the organization, with the anticipation that they would engender "buy-in" up and down the ranks. This did not occur as planned in all cases, and by the time of the Knowledge Fair in April 2007 where CEO and senior executives offices were invited to see the entirety of the ECB Project, a number were surprised by the depth and expanse of the project, expressing a desire to have been more informed along the way. Staff felt what was needed was a balance of informing Senior Management and CEOs of progress and giving too much information and bogging them down in project minutia.

Decision-making input into projects from the field varied, with Ethiopia experiencing the most challenges, although all countries involved experienced this to some degree. Initial contacts and design of pilots largely came from headquarters or consultants but later field inputs increased as the pilots evolved. Ideally, in a second phase intended to focus primarily on improving country-level emergency capacities and response, country directors and partners will be involved in the planning and decision-making from the start.

Although buy-in and learning at the field level are in their infancy stages, except perhaps in the disaster risk reduction work, agencies reported that "the news about the ECB

Project and it's success is spreading," and interest is being generated beyond the pilot countries. It should be noted that field offices did voice the desire to be more engaged from the Project's inception. How much the staff involvement continues to grow will depend on funding and commitment to the Project's goal.

Most interviewees reported that the representation of each of the member's interest in the project been fairly well balanced, at least at the headquarter level. The evaluators noted some differences in alignment within agencies between their headquarters and the field priorities, however. Agencies said they had an equal voice in discussions largely due to the governance structure and to the agencies' desire to work together. Agencies also believed that distribution of funding for sub grants was fair and went through a very thorough process (which became burdensome) of approvals.

The evaluators did encounter some concern over lack of involvement of agencies during some of the activities of the ECB Project, desiring that an agency state upfront that they wish to opt out of certain activities. However, it was felt that agencies couldn't necessarily be faulted for not opting out at the beginning of an activity when we repeatedly heard that the workload mounted over the life of the activity, and often was a progressive revelation of how much time, effort, and resources were required. For larger agencies and agencies with a fair number of staff dedicated to ECB, this increasing workload was less of a concern and able to be dealt with then it was to smaller agencies who may have had fewer staff and resources to contribute. This concern was observed and noted, but it is the view of the evaluation team that these issues of opting out early, attribution, or decisions not to partake in certain activities were really not critical to the operations and effectiveness of the overall project.

A number of formal and informal links to promote learning within and across organizations were evident, and were thriving and appreciated. They ranged from the design of the standing team (a community of professional learning and practice), ICT skills building, the joint field processes, exchange visits, working together on developing proposals and pilots to the more informal sharing of ideas, tools, information exchange, meetings, conferences, and preparing for presentations.

Intangible results attributed to ECB such as increased trust in fellow agencies and the sharing of important information were voiced repeatedly by IWG agencies. Also, while most Agency staff reported substantially increased awareness of the need for increased emergency preparedness and capacity as a result of ECB, there are only a few yet significant examples of documented agency policy changes or new procedures resulting from ECB, and most participants did not realistically expect much organizational change during the initial two-year span of ECB. One notable exception is the CARE emergency strategy that was developed concurrently with CARE's participation in ECB. While CARE officials pointed out that development of the strategy was underway when ECB began, they cite their participation in ECB as strongly enhancing the process. Another is in the area of disaster risk reduction where most agencies made some changes either in policy, number of staff, or restructuring of their emergency departments, reflecting the elevated importance they are giving to DRR work within their agency.

*Communications*

The Project could have benefited from a well thought out communications plan from the inception. Although one was commissioned and one was developed, there was lack of capacity to implement the plan.

Areas where participants believed communications went well were within the agency and between agencies. For instance, Focal Points communicated well with each other, and within agencies, at the headquarters level, Human Resources departments/units communicated well with the emergency units. They also thought that the Project Initiative Managers by and large communicated important messages to them. There were hints of this communication not working well in that the SharePoint website, which was meant to be a place to post and share documents, ended up not being used by many other than the Project Managers, because participants said “we have seen all we need to see in our email inboxes!” On the other hand, it was sensed that the IWG principals could have communicated more to the agencies themselves about important matters, and that communications to field staff were often less than ideal (top-down directives, in part because of time pressures). Striking a balance between how many persons are needed for a decision and how many need to know certain details was difficult, and many believed this should have been revisited over the life of the Project.

## Key Roles

As the Mid Term Review noted, the seven agencies participating in ECB did not have a history of engaging in the level of collaboration required for this project. Hence, the governance structure that was developed was deliberately designed to strengthen mutual trust and afford maximum participation in decision-making.

As Project activities expanded, this governance structure, with key roles played by IWG principals, individual agency “Focal Points,” Initiative Advisors, and Project staff, became very complex. This complexity was exacerbated by increasing external contacts and very high levels of inter and intra agency communications. A review of these key roles observes the following:

### IWG Principals:

- Had the initial vision, maintained interest, and kept momentum moving ahead.
- Supported the ECB effort in their agency and played an important advocacy role internally.
- However, communications between the IWG Principals and the rest of the agency staff working on ECB were not always as clear or consistent as they could have been. More IWG support would have been useful for the Project overall.

### Focal Points:

- Played a much greater role than anticipated. They were originally intended to be someone senior in the agency who would energize their agency and move the Project forward. However, the Focal Points tended to concentrate more on implementation activities and less on advocacy, organizational change processes, or promotion of policy and practice adoption due to the very high and unanticipated workload as well as Project emphasis and direction.
- Several agencies and various staff believed that Focal Points should be more senior. Levels of experience varied among Focal Points.
- Many believed that Focal Points should have been dedicated ECB staff, fully or at least largely paid by the Project.
- There was a fair amount of turnover in Focal Point assignments.

### Initiative Advisors:

- Most advisors are providing important guidance to the Project.
- Professional/technical direction is very good in most cases.
- Developed communities of practices among their peers (but not necessarily within their own agencies).
- Found support and solidarity among themselves.
- Useful and necessary part of Project management and implementation.

Project staff:

- Project Director's position and responsibilities were very complex and difficult due to multiple agencies, partner organizations and initiatives. High level of appreciation for the challenges faced by the Director and his accomplishments.
- Relatively low staff turnover. Positions to manage added over the duration of the Project led to growing responsibilities and workload.
- Dispersed staff has both advantages and disadvantages. While "hosted" staff had the advantage of influencing their host agency, a completely dispersed core staff reduced management efficiency.
- A number of agencies expressed strong interest in being part of the interview process for key Project management staff, not a CARE ECB Management decision alone, especially since the staff have so much interaction with the agencies – the agencies have to like, respect, and work with the managers almost daily. While some agencies were involved in the process, others did not feel they had a say or enough knowledge about the processes.
- Interviewees cited these qualities for Project staff: ability to move the work forward smoothly, being a team player, visionary or at least technically competent in the area they are to lead, good facilitator, and people skills.
- Project staff deals with an extremely cumbersome financial management process – highly labor intensive requiring excessive staff time.

Like many other elements of the ECB Project, the roles of these key individuals evolved with the Project. Some were affected by increasing workload, others by the need to assume or define authorities and responsibilities. In a Project that began with a recognized necessity to evolve and a strong tendency to be as inclusive as possible, these changes in role are not surprising. Indeed, they provide considerable insight and a basis for future Project management.

## Evaluation Findings

*If there is a single, basic conclusion to this evaluation of the Emergency Capacity Building project, it is that it was clearly worth undertaking and with strong, continued IWG and donor support, it will contribute significantly to enhanced emergency response capacities in the participating agencies. Further, with a dedicated external effort, it has major potential to improve response capacity in the broader humanitarian community*

### A – Initiative Findings

#### 1. *Staff Capacity Development (Initiative One)*

Goal: That participating agencies will be prepared to respond faster in emergencies and provide higher quality response with better trained and more rapidly deployed staff.

Planned outcomes<sup>6</sup>:

1. Agencies will be prepared to respond faster in emergencies and provide higher quality responses with better-trained and more rapidly deployed staff.
2. There will be evidence of adoption of improved HR management practices by all IWG member agencies and other humanitarian organizations.
3. Agencies will increase internal and external funding for staff capacity management activities.

Initiative One is generally considered by most ECB participants to be the most productive initiative. Some of the factors that made this a successful initiative were clear vision, strong leadership, consistent staff, managers for each of the pilot projects, good communications (although perhaps too many), and a phased approach with clearly outlined activities to reach the outcomes. Initiative One has the largest number of team members (well over 50) working on the internal projects necessitating high-quality management to achieve the results it has to date.

#### *Examples of Initiative One Activities*

Initiative One also had the most activities, which included research producing studies on building trust among teams, better practices in preparing for a surge in staff during emergencies, metrics (or inventory of staff skills), why staff leave agencies and how to retain them, and National staff capacity building. Many of these have led to pilot projects, some of which are still underway, such as three Metrics Dashboard pilot projects in Indonesia, Sudan and Ethiopia - their final results could not be covered in this evaluation. Research and development of an emergency response simulation had also recently been piloted in two countries and with two models – single-agency and multi-agency. Additionally a training of trainers was undertaken and a revised Simulation Tool and

<sup>6</sup> In the Findings section, these outcomes are from the Revised Implementation Plan narrative.

Administrators' Guide is being written. The simulations were well received in the field (Ethiopia and Sierra Leone) and according to feedback, gave agencies a unique and real opportunity to work together with local entities on a mock emergency. Some IWG agencies plan to make this a part of their training for emergency response teams. Initiative staff have also developed a staff capacity framework and undertaken some limited exchange visits. Lastly, they have developed working relationships on various aspects of the above-mentioned projects with People In Aid and the Emergency Personnel Network (EPN).

### **Success Story: Staff Retention Study**

Staff turnover is often cited as a major cause of program shortcomings – every agency has suffered from “the revolving door syndrome” yet agencies also need flexibility to adjust staffing levels as program needs change. How can agencies improve retention and better manage the consequences when good people leave?

The ODI Humanitarian Practice Network published the results of The Staff Capacity Initiative looking at these issues in a report entitled “Understanding and Addressing Staff Turnover in Humanitarian Agencies.” It was distributed to approximately 5000 human resources and management professionals in humanitarian organizations as well as featured in the April 2006 People In Aid newsletter distributed to an additional 2500 humanitarian aid professionals.

With the high number of activities undertaken in this initiative, agency reactions have been varied. However, it is important to note that each agency has reported significant learning (in varying degrees) in all of the activities. The “take home” lessons have varied depending on the maturity and structure of the various agencies, and not necessarily because of the quality of the Initiative One work.

Evaluations from agency staff participating in the Staff Capacity Development Initiative reflected these varying viewpoints. They noted that:

- *Peer learning has been significant; several cited specific examples (one example is World Vision's 2-day training at Mercy Corps).*
- *It took time to build trust, but was worth the effort.*
- *Involvement in ECB will broaden their career opportunities in the future.*
- *The simulation pilots provide an opportunity to network with others in emergencies.*
- *They are just starting to use some of the tools they have developed.*
- *Better communications and understanding of needs between their emergency departments and human resource departments have occurred; also, similar improvements are noticeable with the IT departments.*
- *They will reap the benefits from the development of these tools when they are put into practice on a regular basis. Right now, it is just the beginning.*

In a January 2007 meeting in Atlanta, Initiative One participants were asked about their organizations' progress on this initiative. Most noted progress in the area of responding to

emergencies in an effective and timely manner, and all agencies reported appreciation for what their own agency staff were gaining from the project, especially in sharing lessons learned, increased collaboration, and a sense of partnership. Further, a number noted increases in emergency staffing and/or a restructuring of their emergency departments or emergency strategies.

While this self-reporting provides useful information about Project progress, it is, in reality, challenging to measure ‘speed of response’ or ‘quality of response’ without defining precisely what those concepts mean, and agencies believe that the outcomes will be more evident after the current project ends. The commitment to train staff more thoroughly and deploy them more rapidly along with improving the quality of their response is already evident.

Other individual agency activities have credited this initiative with helping to develop or enhance work on new emergency response strategies. Another large agency hosted a global human resources conference and shared the retention study feedback; “this information is invaluable,” one participant noted. All Initiative One advisors contacted agreed that the National Staff Development study and pilot was a very worthwhile activity. It is apparent that in these and other Initiative One activities there was a serious effort by agency representatives to produce as high quality results as possible.


Linking Initiative One work with the ICT Initiative (Initiative Four) to develop a web-based data system to support the Staff Capacities Metrics Project is underway – an effort that intends to track the development of staff and their performance at the country level.

Initiative One also uniquely experienced proprietary issues that arose when agencies had spent considerable time and funds investing in a tool which they believed gave them a unique ‘advantage’. However, in the collaborative spirit of IWG participation in ECB, these issues were negotiated and the sharing of these tools and training modules benefited all agencies at once. These decisions represent a strong commitment to the ECB partnership, since agencies tend to hold tightly to those advantages which give them organizational individuality.

#### *Utility of Initiative One Products*

In the “partnership” questionnaire, respondents from all levels of ECB Project as well as partner organizations were given a list of the approximately 21 ECB “products” thus far, and asked to rate their use (most respondents are using tools developed in Initiative One together with the Accountability Initiative’s “Good Enough Guide”). See Figure 3 for rankings on the top seven “products”.

Figure 3.



This initiative also worked with a number of partners including ALNAP and People In Aid, among others, who reported gaining from the relationship with the ECB Project. They report that their staff's capacities were enhanced through association with ECB, and two partners reported that their credibility and professional image was also enhanced. One challenge involving partner organizations was the lack of an established agreement between them and the ECB to undertake activities in a more planned and anticipated manner.

#### *Progress towards Outcomes*

This initiative ranks high in performance and achievement of activities. While it would be too lengthy to go into each result, and its corresponding outputs and monitoring indicators for this initiative, each achievement has been tracked in Appendix III, and this initiative has either completed or made significant progress towards the activities outlined in the logframe. Agency representatives decided not to pursue three of the seventeen activities outlined in the results section of the logframe. A few activities are still underway (as of this writing) however are well on track to completion before the end of project.

## **2. Accountability and Impact Measurement (AIM or Initiative Two)**

Goal: To enhance agency accountability to humanitarian standards and improve practice in impact measurement.

Planned outcomes:

1. IWG agencies establish interagency processes that improve the practice of accountability and impact measurement capacities in the field.
2. A “how to” guide completed that continues to support capacity development on “good enough” accountability and impact measurement practice.

The outputs from the Accountability initiative are substantial. This initiative began slowly and thoroughly redesigned its objectives at a meeting in Washington DC and at a pivotal Nairobi meeting (Feb. 2006). In Nairobi, the group brought together the key stakeholders, reassessed the project design, refined and scaled down activities, and based objectives on more realistic expectations. The decisions made during these meetings have been validated by the final outcomes of these decisions, e.g. the “Good Enough Guide,” training modules, use in the field, and steps towards concrete improvement in accountability within agencies.

It should be noted that the DC and Nairobi meetings are a better practice - that is - to get stakeholders on the same page and to tackle the issues in a setting that provides face-to-face contact, sufficient time, and a working space (as well as socializing opportunities). In the redesign of Initiative Two activities, there was a deliberate focus on concrete activities targeted at the field. Though recognized as important, advocacy within organizations and addressing broader policies and systems that support accountability and impact measurement did not receive as much attention.

There was early concern among Initiative Two partners that the work of ECB would overlap or duplicate work of other entities or of their own mandates (such as People In Aid and HAP-I). These concerns were worked out for the most part and later turned out not to be the case. The ECB Project’s work was complementary and/or value-added to most partners it worked with on various activities.

Greater accountability in emergencies has emerged as an important and serious concern for both donors and implementing agencies. The work of this ECB initiative is also timely given the poor accountability of many agencies in the Asian tsunami response. There, beneficiaries’ needs and voice often became a footnote in the scramble to deliver services and the “good enough” approach developed through the work of Initiative Two puts beneficiaries in a more central and participatory role, both in emergency response accountability practices, as well as associated M&E activities.

#### *Examples of Initiative Two Activities*

The Interagency Standing Team concept was developed by Initiative Two as a mechanism to help field staff address accountability and impact measurement issues. They are expected to be able to provide training, facilitation, and monitoring and evaluation expertise. Team members have already been deployed to Niger, South Sudan, Guatemala, and Mozambique and team members have reported considerable satisfaction in being involved in these efforts. It is generally agreed that the work of these teams

provides good evidence of joint collaboration for accountability, with more examples to come.

An “End of Initiative Survey” was conducted among Accountability Initiative members with the results illustrated in Table 2 below:

*(\*Results are from the End of Project /Summary of Survey on the ECB SharePoint site.)*

**Table 2. What was the level of change in each organization on:**

<b>Question area</b>	<b>Field Level</b>	<b>Headquarter level</b>
1) Networking on AIM	6 - some	4 – some 2 – significant
2) Policies	2 – none 4 – some	1 – none 4 – some 1- significant
3) Senior Responsibility on AIM	1 – none 5 – some	2 – none 3 – some 1 – significant
4) Funds for AIM	4 – some 2 – significant	1 – none 3 – some 2 - significant
5) Staff resources	4 – some 2 – significant	5 – some 1 - significant
6) Staff Training	1 – none 3 – some 2 – significant	4 – some 2 – significant
7) Compliance tracking	2 – none 3 – some 1 – significant	2 – none 3 – some 1 – significant

Bringing the work of Initiative Two to the field level is more challenging and has met with less success as of this writing, particularly in Accountability and Impact Measurement (AIM) activities; however, field work is underway and requests from the field for the “Good Enough Guide” (GEG) are exponentially increasing. In the end of survey report analysis, Initiative Two members self-reported more significant changes at HQ level for networking on AIM, policies, funding, staff resources, and training than at the field level.

While the main output of this initiative has been the GEG, there have been less visible activities (and more minor activities) in other areas such as having a consultant examine options for strengthening complementarities (i.e. cooperation, collaboration, and integration) among the accountability network initiatives (HAP-I, ALNAP, Sphere, URD, Co-ordination Sud.) and the work of the ECB Project. Granted, ECB has limited control over strengthening these complementarities. The idea is not to duplicate what each group is doing, but to build upon each other’s efforts.

Another output of Initiative Two was the design of an accountability framework to use in peer review of agency work, primarily designed for a second Phase of the ECB Project. Agencies started work on this framework with a self-assessment to define the baseline positions of each agency on accountability and impact measurement of their emergency program work. While it is too early to provide comment on impact, these reflective processes have value internally for the agency and potentially across agencies (in future such joint projects) where ‘outside agencies’ can provide feedback and share methods, as well as learn from each other, with the goal of improving on a larger scale accountability in emergency operations.


*Utility of Initiative Two Products*

The Primary ‘products’ from this initiative are:


- The Good Enough Guide (GEG), with a training module for the GEG (agencies have developed their own training plans) to be refined.
- The creation of the Interagency Standing Team and subsequent deployments.
- Building collaboration with other quality and accountability activities.
- Promoting and supporting joint evaluations.
- Common Accountability Framework (due to be finalized in early July).

The Good Enough Guide, designed for field emergency workers provides a “set of basic guidelines on how to be accountable to local people and measure program impact in emergency situations”. The Guide has attracted considerable attention from external observers. The GEG is available as a free download or for sale through Oxfam publishing (see Figures 4 and 5 below). Orders through May 2007 totaled 1740 from ECB Organizations and contributors to the guide totaled 76.<sup>7</sup> External agency and entity acquisition of the guide has primarily been through downloads.

**Figure 4.**



**Figure 5.**



Based upon interviews undertaken for this evaluation, most ECB agencies are finding the GEG to be of value. Also in use is the supporting Good Enough training module, which,

<sup>7</sup> As of this writing, two agencies reported requesting over 2000 copies each for their field operations.

together with the Guide itself, provides two tools to strengthen staff skills on accountability and impact measurement. While the Guide is relatively simple in approach, it fits a niche for field accountability and speaks directly to the issue of inclusion and participation of beneficiaries in the emergency response, an issue that has received lip service for decades in humanitarian aid.

The combination of the Guide, a training session to introduce it, and staff that are trained to conduct such trainings has good potential to enhance the impact of the “good enough” approach to Accountability and Impact Measurement within the IWG agencies. Four IWG agencies have developed a training plan for the guide, although all agencies are working out plans to use the guide, and three agencies are taking steps to incorporate the Guide into emergency manuals and trainings.

Many interviewees reported that the process of producing the guide was highly collaborative including partners, field staff for pilot testing, and the IWG agencies. It is clear that the value of going through that collective process has been significant for many in Initiative Two.

A multi-stakeholder event focused around sharing accountability and impact measurement, better practices, and how to define next steps was held in Rome (December 2006). Participants came from the IWG agencies, UN agencies, government donors, networks, and other groups. The “Good Enough Approach” was introduced there with a considerably positive reception. This was one of the few ECB events open to the broader humanitarian community, and many of the external (to IWG) agency staff who were interviewed for this evaluation welcomed that event. It provided non-IWG members with an inside look at ECB activities and a chance to share their ideas and concerns.

#### *Progress towards Outcomes and Preliminary Impacts*

While very preliminary and self-reported, the Guide appears to be having some impact within the seven agencies, and there are individual evidences of its use in the field. For instance, most of the IWG agencies are developing training manuals for future trainings, it is being incorporated into some agency M&E manuals, and it has certainly raised accountability awareness both at headquarters emergency response teams and to some extent in the field where it has been tested and/or employed. In the field, the Guide was used to develop a beneficiary complaint system in Indonesia during the recent earthquake in Jojakarta region. These are early but promising signs that the Guide can improve accountability. However, to achieve more broad reaching impact, a larger number of staff, more non-IWG agencies, and field exposure and training will need to occur.

For standing team members, one noted that *“this was the best part of my work – exposure to other agencies and collegiate sharing and working together in the field.”* She went on to say that *“it isn’t often you get exposure to other agencies’ approaches and that collectively they often come to creative and thoughtful ideas and/or resolution of problems.”* These deployments have involved not only agency experts in M&E but also field staff and community members. The model of the standing team member concept

appears to be a good one; the challenge will be both balancing the number of requests that can be answered and keeping this work as a priority within agencies.

Overall, there was a strong consensus among Initiative Two participants that progress on this initiative was “good enough,” of which the evaluators concur. There is concern over the sustainability of the standing teams, however, as it has been a challenge to have teams deploy in every instance or request.

Further details for each result and their outcomes can be found in Appendix III. In essence, Initiative Two has accomplished sufficient achievements against its outcome and monitoring level indicators outlined in the revised implementation plan logframe.

### **3. *Disaster Risk Reduction***

Goal: To improve capacity for disaster risk reduction (DRR) among IWG agency staff, affected communities, and local and national authorities.

Planned outcomes:

1. IWG agencies in each pilot country agree on the meaning of terminology, identify promising practices for DRR in the specific context, and share this information in learning dissemination.
2. IWG agencies will have implemented a variety of promising, community-based DRR projects in at least three pilot countries and disseminated results widely.
3. Hands-on DRR training packages for program staff and other key stakeholders, such as government officials, other agency staff, and local community members will be developed and implemented in three pilot countries.
4. Selected communities in the three pilot countries are better prepared to respond effectively to disasters.
5. Selected communities have gained more experience in advocating for community-based DRR.
6. Local and/or national authorities in the three pilot countries, and at least one academic institution are more aware of DRR principles.

Disaster Risk Reduction, a relatively new industry term of practice, represents a part of humanitarian action which has been the most consistently under-funded and under-performed. DRR incorporates several activities that are known to work and can save many more lives than relief:

- Preparedness (which includes stockpiling of aid supplies).
- Local capacity building (for example, strengthening the knowledge, outreach, and transport ability of local NGOs such as the Red Cross).
- Prevention (eliminating the hazard or the exposure to the hazard).
- Mitigation (reducing the vulnerability to the hazard).
- Early Warning (giving people an earlier heads-up to get out of harm’s way).
- Early Response (facilitating the ability of local entities to take instant action).

The Emergency Capacity Building Project took these challenges into account when setting out to expand the scale of DRR work among its members. The need for IWG agencies to address this ECB initiative dealing with DRR is clear. Recent large-scale disasters have highlighted the critical importance of preparedness. Experience, particularly recent experience, demonstrates that countries can be doing more to prepare and protect their citizens. It is also recognized that NGOs can play a role in assisting them to do that.

Initiative 3 also started slowly. In fact, after nearly a year, ECB senior management had to take control and be more directive. Several factors (many noted in the Mid Term Review) applied:

- Conceptually, disaster risk reduction was a challenge to understand; the focus of this initiative was on the field and more directly with the beneficiary, not as much on capacity building as the other initiatives, and there were shortcomings in design that were never really modified to any significant degree.
- DRR has a relatively small body of knowledge and limited practices exist in this field.
- Few agencies believed they had the technical strengths to deal with DRR and only a few received money to undertake pilot projects. There also was reluctance at first because of uncertain HQ support and, to some extent, priority to address this subject in some agencies was limited (One agency said they “don’t do DRR”).
- The initiative was “top-down” driven rather than soliciting inputs in design at the field level (While this generated some initial resentment, now that it is nearly finishing, those reasons are more acceptable).
- Turnover of staff was high, and a face-to-face meeting among Initiative 3 team members only occurred one year into the project.
- Pilot proposals were submitted late and much of the work was outsourced.

#### *Examples of Initiative Three activities*

The Initiative set out to first research DRR models and identify promising practices and tools in the area of disaster risk reduction/prevention, as well as document them. These steps of need, identification of practices, and good working models were done for each of the initiatives in the ECB Project (Phase I – as mentioned previously). All but two of the IWG agencies then identified and engaged in leadership of 9 pilot projects to be conducted in three countries. Those chosen were a good mix of disaster-types that agencies frequently respond to – Guatemala, for natural weather disasters (hurricanes, floods, tornados); Ethiopia, for slow onset food and drought disasters; and Indonesia, for earthquake and potential tsunami disasters among other weather-related natural disasters. These pilot projects included sensitization about DRR at the field level, training on DRR to a diverse audience of key stakeholders, including community members, and the development of local action plans as part of the training.

The Initiative generated reports on the pilot projects and trainings, whereby multiple external organizations and partners partook, and a final pilot study report is pending

circulation. This Initiative also devised a ‘writeshop workshop’ to develop a DRR manual which upon completion was made available on the ECB public website.

#### *Utility of Initiative Three Products*

A number of respondents from the surveys said the pilot work of DRR in general was very beneficial to them and/or their agencies and that, for them, it was rated as one of the top useful outputs from the project overall. (In this evaluation’s partnership survey, it was rated the third most important output of the Project behind GEG and Metrics work).

To have made more impact, agencies would have also liked to see the development of a compendium of better practices and useful tools in order that collectively they could have one voice (advocacy) to donors and governments.

#### *Progress towards outcomes (and preliminary impacts)*

While this initiative may be perceived the ‘under performer’ of the ECB Project, it is coming in with a surprise finish. Both limited specific results and several “intangible” outcomes appear to be emerging. Among them are the following:

- Models and promising practices for disaster risk reduction have been designed and tested in three pilot countries.
- A hands-on training package for program staff and community members in disaster risk reduction has been developed.
- Advocacy initiatives were piloted in three countries to promote the acceptance of and commitment to disaster risk reduction principles by local and/or national authorities and other key stakeholders.
- DRR is now higher priority in nearly all IWG agency emergency portfolios.
- One agency has as part of their proposal process a ‘requirement’ to address DRR for emergency response.
- Another agency has incorporated risk reduction into its approach of transforming communities.
- There is a link with Initiative Four to develop an online workspace for agencies to work during an emergency response crisis (The Guatemala Collaboration Platform).
- There is a better understanding of meaning and importance of DRR within agencies. (Some agency staff are surprised to hear Senior management put DRR in speeches as an important issue to address).
- Agencies will be taking the lessons learned from the three pilot countries and using them as part of future DRR programming. Also, most IWG agencies will continue engagement with the UNISDR Global Platform, and Mercy Corps’ representative will continue to co-chair the Interaction working group on DRR.
- Although initial understanding of the objective was a problem, the concepts developed by this project in the conceptualization of DRR, basic concepts, and definition of related terminologies and emergency preparedness planning conceptualization for the organization were helpful.
- The National Workshop (Ethiopia) on the relevance of DRR and the other related workshops brought together outside partners such as government officials.

Other examples also exist - one successful activity in Indonesia took in a pilot project area of West Sumatra, which began implementing DRR activities. In December 2006, a reportedly successful and well-attended earthquake and tsunami evacuation simulation was organized in nine villages. Local government officials, NGOs, media, and police participated. Initiative staff have also developed connections with UNISDR and UNDP in helping to set-up a Global Network of NGOs on Community Resilience to Disasters, as well as with related research groups.

The Initiative has made sufficient progress towards accomplishing its outcome and monitoring outcome indicators. Documentation of training numbers, compositions of persons trained, and engagement of non-IWG entities, including universities and UN agencies, can be found in Appendix III. However, what wasn't measured is not documented - the intangible achievements at the agency and local levels where the activities of this initiative have now generated interest and greater knowledge and been given a higher priority to address in programming within Agencies.

#### ***4. Information and Communication Technology***

Goal: To identify the challenges of organizations in the use of information, communications, and technology in their response to humanitarian crises.

Planned Outcomes:

1. Greater internal coherence in IWG agencies in understanding the challenges faced in information technology and requirements.
2. Improved links between IT and humanitarian assistance departments.
3. Provide an online shared workspace to the ECB Project.
4. Identify ICT gaps and needs in the humanitarian response of IWG members.
5. Explore tangible solutions to address these breaches in effective and efficient response.

Initiative Four was among the four initiatives originally suggested in the July 2004 Report on Emergency Capacity by Spee Braun. While it was not included in the August 2004 proposal submitted to the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation by the IWG members, the initiative was funded separately, as a part of ECB, through a substantial (\$1 million) cash gift from Microsoft Corporation and supported by additional (multi-million dollar) gifts of software applications and licenses from Microsoft as well.

With some of its objectives (see above) focused on greater internal understanding of technology requirements and improved internal organizational links, the challenges facing the work of Initiative Four were both technical and cultural. However, the work of the initiative benefited from the fact that the agency representatives involved in the initiative were well qualified, knowledgeable and in many cases, held senior positions and were familiar with each other. In addition, Initiative Four is closely associated with NetHope, an information technology consortium of 18 leading international NGO's, which provides a complimentary platform for external outreach and initiative activities.

### *Examples of Initiative Four Activities*

The initial significant output of Initiative Four was the extensive ECB Information and Technology Requirements Assessment, a seven-month (September 1, 2005 – March 31, 2006) effort that provided a detailed overview of the use of information and technology within IWG agencies. The Assessment involved meetings and discussions with the headquarters staff of all seven IWG agencies as well as visits to emergency operations in Pakistan and Sudan.

The Assessment identified and described “good practices” at five of the seven IWG agencies, noting systems, and technology uses that were in place and possibly replicable to other organizations. Its key findings focused on the importance of national capacity, institutional support requirements for ICT activities, the strategic management considerations necessary for successful ICT activities, information requirements, and the importance of external partnerships.

A second major Initiative Four activity, conducted through NetHope, is the ICT Skills Building Program. Both the Assessment and the group of agency managers involved in Initiative Four identified skills building as one of the most critical factors in the effort to enhance the use of ICT in the field. Initiated in October 2006 with input from more than ten international NGO’s and supported by ECB funding as well as other support, the ICT Skills Building Program recently began its June-December 2007 pilot program.

### *Utility of Initiative Products*

The Skills Building Program offers low cost courses for NGO staff engaged in administrative support work and technology activities, with subject areas including telecommunications technology, IT project management, technical support, and office productivity. Options for training include on-site, classroom training at local facilities, live online training, and self-paced training. At this writing, online and self-paced trainings are underway, as well as a pilot program in Nairobi with over 60 attendees from 10 NGOs. The training programs are open to non-ECB member agencies. Additional training programs are planned in succeeding months in India, Guatemala, and again in Kenya.

Both the Information and Technology Requirements Assessment, and the Skills Building Program have been very well received by ECB participants. Initiative managers recognized that the time required for the Assessment would necessarily precede most initiative activities, and despite the requirements of this time frame, these two activities, as well as the development of the ECB SharePoint website, are clearly significant achievements for this initiative. In addition, Initiative Four collaboration with the Metrics Project, the Guatemala Information Center, and the Emergency Response ICT Resource Center, has demonstrated the continuing applicability of Initiative Four objectives.

### *Initiative Impacts*

Many of those interviewed “outside the IT arena” expressed a perception that the work of Initiative Four will have significant future potential, especially in the field where it is

wanted and needed. Field staff particularly noted the need for and importance of training and their ability to have greater “linkage” to headquarters on IT matters. Interviewees also commented that while initially the planning for Initiative Four was not as focused as they would have wanted, post-Assessment activities and involvement with NetHope have dramatically changed their views and perceptions about the potential to apply IT technology to emergency preparedness.

For their part, agency IT managers involved in Initiative Four are convinced that the capacity exists to help field emergency operations through improved ICT methods and they are waiting to help. But they also note that a limitation to being responsive to the needs of emergency staff in the field, is the difficulty that such staff have (within their organizational culture) in articulating their requirements. These managers note that traditional emergency operations are not “mature” in a technical sense. “Our emergency people don’t define their problems in an IT context –it’s difficult for them to do that,” one manager commented, pointing out that program staff must make an effort to be more engaged in IT, since they are so dependent on it. Some program staff countered with the view that IT staff are not as familiar with program activities as they might be.

However, any objective analysis of Initiative Four must conclude that there has been substantial progress towards achievement of its planned outcomes. The Assessment Report, which identified ICT gaps and began a process of exploring solutions was extremely well received (there have been over 1000 downloads from the ECB website alone). The development of the Skills Building Program has major potential for helping to meet training needs in the field. The ECB internal SharePoint website, as well as the Project’s external website, are both valuable outcomes work with other initiatives has contributed to overall ECB success.

With plans for much of the work of Initiative Four to be continued by NetHope, there is considerable potential for outreach to the broader humanitarian community – a major goal envisioned by the ECB project. NetHope’s outreach to non-ECB members, particularly a growing network of local NGO chapters, funded through ECB as a means to improve linkage to field staff in local NGOs, holds considerable promise for expansion of this Initiative’s work and bringing the benefits of IT to those engaged in emergency response.

## B. Overall Project Findings

In an era of large-scale emergencies, and with predictions of more in the future, the notion of improving emergency response capacity is timely and important. The Agency staff interviewed for this evaluation, as well as partners interviewed, overwhelmingly viewed the project processes and outputs of the ECB Project as worthwhile. As noted in the Mid Term Review and verified by this evaluation, collaboration, intra and interagency dialogue, the building of trust, and an increase in learning were the most valued outputs of the Project.

Overall, the agencies believed that their emergency departments were more efficient and effective, particularly with the improved collaboration and understandings developed with the Human Resources Department/unit and with IT staff. In the field, where initial examples of improved collaboration have occurred, most believed that the Project had not had enough time to mature to say definitively that this fledgling beginning was enough to have a lasting impact on the overall goals of the ECB Project.

The Project's activities and engagement with the seven partner organizations, particularly those in accountability (HAP-I, ALNAP, Sphere, People In Aid), disaster risk reduction (ISDR), and information and communication technology (NetHope) is positive and worthwhile.

Of the outputs and products, the ones most appreciated were: the Good Enough Approach, Metrics Pilot Project, the collective Disaster Risk Reduction pilot projects, the Quality & Accountability Initiatives (such as the Disaster Emergency committee formed, working with HAP - I on accountability tracking in the field), development and use of the Interagency Standing Teams, the National Staff Development Program, and the Staff Retention & Turnover Study. There is increasing evidence that the Skills Building Program will also be among these activities.

Inter and Intra agency collaboration and learning were the most appreciated part of the process, and working together to solve issues that agency staff passionately believe in was gratifying and helped to build their own capacity. Networking with partners was also largely successful, building upon the strengths of these organizations to delve into common and persistent issues in emergency response. All of these activities compounded with a complex governance and financing structure made workloads untenable at times, so much so, that no Focal Point will continue in his or her role in a future Project.

Field participants reflect that they have learned a great deal from the pilots, increased their own capacities, and see the potential positive impact of the Project in the future should it continue. Admittedly, field involvement came late and not always in the best manner or approach, however, it is in place and growing.

### **Examples of ECB Project Better practices\***

#### Management

- Overall face-to-face meetings.
- Reflection meetings.
- Good practice to involve key agency staff in hiring, but ECB management needs to be sure this is more inclusive.
- Hosting a global knowledge fair; and have it more frequently (e.g. once a year).
- Funding - to provide advancement of funds, however, these need to be extended over a longer period of time, and they need to be less encumbered in reporting requirements.

#### Programmatic

- Overall identification of activities and how they would be carried out (consultants, agencies, partners).
- Establishing meetings at the beginning of initiative activities that provide opportunities for stakeholders to get on the same page and to tackle issues in a setting that provides face-to-face contact, sufficient time, and a working space (as well as socializing opportunities).

\* non-exhaustive list

Table 3 below describes the evaluators' observations of the overall findings.

**Table 3. Overall Project Observations**

	Interagency Relations	Collaboration On ECB Activities (Interagency)	Finances & Budgeting	Communication	Governance & Management	Engagement with External partners	Engagement & Interaction with Broader HA sector	Field Engagement
ECB Project Overall	Very Good	Good	Budget and fund allocation requires attention	Balance needed; too much internally too little externally	Good (Project staff)	Good	Lower than planned	Lower than planned
ECB 1	Very Good	Good	Complicated time consuming processes	Clear, perhaps too much	Good	Maximized potential	Very good made use of external entities	Limited but positive
ECB 2	Very Good	Delayed but ultimately successful	Complicated time consuming processes	Unclear based on initial design but remedied	Initial concerns about direction But later clarified	Good	Moderate (mainly through production and dissemination of guide)	Limited but developing
ECB3	Developing in the field	Delayed but current processes are good	Imbalanced between agencies	Top down, not enough preliminary information sent to field	Delayed project development	Moderate	Delayed but underway	Delayed start but good progress
ECB 4	Very Good	Good	No procedural issues	Good (based on existing networks & relationships)	Delayed/ad hoc	Good	Good In Progress	Limited but good potential

## Views From the Field

The obvious importance of field engagement in ECB activities has been noted throughout this evaluation document and will be the critical factor in future ECB activities. While field engagement developed slowly and, in some cases, not without resentment, it is now seen as an integral part of Project activities. The total number of field staff involved in the Project (such as in Pilot activities) continues to expand, but that involvement will also require further support and innovative management approaches if overall ECB objectives are to be attained.

In this regard, the "organizational spread" of the Project is important from the field perspective. The Project emanated from emergency departments, reaching HR and IT departments across the issues of capacity building. However, to create organizational change and impact throughout the organization around these issues is a longer-term endeavor, requiring sound communication, knowledge, advocacy, practice, and visual payoffs – especially in order to include field participation as well. In some of the larger agencies, Project and regional directors had line authority to the field and engaged field offices in ECB activities, often with varying results. This process of field involvement was not always accomplished to the extent needed, and contributed to delays in reaching the field effectively from the start.

Now ECB has started to feed into field accountability, for example, with the development of the GEG; disaster risk reduction pilot projects are causing more field involvement; the many tools developed through Initiative One will soon have field impact as will some Initiative Four applications. Agency staff report that field personnel are becoming more engaged in ECB activities and some agencies are finding that interest has generated enough that other country offices are asking about ECB or wanting to be a part of it.

The field survey for this evaluation asked the following questions:

1. *What do you see as the key strengths/benefits from your involvement with the ECB project? Please list in order of importance.*
2. *What do you see as the main weaknesses or gaps from your involvement with the ECB project?*

Answers (not in order of importance) to the two above questions are shown in Table 4 below:

**Table 4. Strengths and Weaknesses of ECB Project**

<b>Strengths/Benefits</b>	<b>Weaknesses/Gaps</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ Brought major stakeholders together to discuss ECB.</li> <li>❖ Brought to light some lessons and best practices of IWG members.</li> <li>❖ An opportunity to exchange experiences on emergency capacity building at global level.</li> <li>❖ Establishment of ECB and DM Unit in World Vision Ethiopia.</li> <li>❖ The project draws attention of donors.</li> <li>❖ Involved institutions and affected/vulnerable communities to benefit from the project in the future.</li> <li>❖ Produced a guide to disaster risk reduction in Ethiopia.</li> <li>❖ Shared expertise among NGOs.</li> <li>❖ Shared resources among NGOs.</li> <li>❖ Increased awareness of ECB and good practices.</li> <li>❖ Conceptualization of the importance of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR).</li> <li>❖ Relationship/partnership building with higher educational institutions.</li> <li>❖ Closer working relationship and mutual learning from member organizations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ The language - everything is in English.</li> <li>❖ Design of the ECB Project didn't involve field offices.</li> <li>❖ Coordination was weak at the field level due to various reasons.</li> <li>❖ Low participation of IWG members at the field level.</li> <li>❖ Did not have adequate staffing at the field level.</li> <li>❖ Did not have vehicles nor other equipment to run the project.</li> <li>❖ Too HQ-oriented.</li> <li>❖ Poor understanding and communication between HQ and field offices of partners.</li> <li>❖ Cumbersome management of the project.</li> <li>❖ Limited linkage between in-country programs and ECB.</li> <li>❖ Staff turnover from the ECB members is high.</li> <li>❖ The initial conceptualization of the program was top-down with minimum involvement from the field/country offices.</li> <li>❖ Consequently minimum understanding of the objectives and buy-in of the program at the initial stage to provide appropriate and sufficient support.</li> </ul>

The lessons (from the process of engaging the field in ECB activities) will ensure sustainability. This process will take at least two or three more years to change the culture of the operating environment and to ensure agency mainstreaming of products and services. This may happen without another ECB project, but a continued and consistent ECB approach will increase the speed and acceptance of that process.

## Conclusions and Recommendations

### A. Conclusions

1. If there is a single, basic conclusion to this evaluation of the Emergency Capacity Building project, it is that it was clearly worth undertaking and with strong, continued IWG and donor support, it will contribute significantly to enhanced emergency response capacities in the participating agencies. Further, with a dedicated external effort, it has major potential to improve response capacity in the broader humanitarian community.
2. Within the IWG, the substantially increased levels of trust, coordination, improved relationships, and willingness to share information and resources has been the ECB Project's most important outcome.
3. It was inevitable that a project of this complexity, with few precedents or reference points, would experience some initial delay, early unrealistic expectations about achievements, complications in management and communications, and partial redesign.
4. It is also laudable that, despite the problems of complexity and delay, positive results, to varying degrees, are evident in all Project Initiatives.
5. With its multi-agency nature, efficient governance of Project process is absolutely essential to achievement of ECB goals.
6. The use of Partner Organizations is key to reaching the broader external humanitarian community.

### B. Recommendations

**The recommendations that have emerged from this evaluation are presented with the intention of being applicable to a continuation or expansion of ECB activities. They are as follows :**

1. The Interagency Working Group should assure that the continuing focus of the ECB Project is on the enhancement of participating agency emergency response capacity and avoid any perception that the Project is its own organizational entity or an end in itself. This can be achieved by:
  - Minimizing the branding of the name ECB.
  - Maximizing the openness of communications with agencies not involved with ECB by, for example, presenting at workshops, conferences, and by inviting agencies and organizations to events.

- Hosting a workshop with IWG key agency staff to clarify identify and reaffirm goal commitments with the donor, within the agencies and among agencies.
2. Any continuation of Project activities must be flexible to accommodate changes in planning and implementation. This can be achieved by:
    - Periodic reflection gatherings to review issues and possible changes.
    - Strategic discussions about when the ECB acts as a group or when actions may be appropriate by individual members.
    - Recognizing that there are stages of adaptability and acceptance of ideas and innovations and capitalizing on these processes to more effectively influence the broader humanitarian community. The innovation-decision process includes:
      - knowledge stage (awareness).
      - persuasion stage (advocacy).
      - decision stage - an individual or decision-making unit comes to a point to adopt or reject the innovation (new/better practice).
      - implementation (practical application).
      - confirmation (seeks information for reinforcement of their decision).
  3. There must be early attention in any continuation of ECB to define and clarify authorities, terms, indicators of success, decision-making and roles. This can be achieved by an initial meeting and one within the first year and/or circulation of documents for comments that would:
    - Define organizational change, organizational learning, disaster risk reduction, and other important terminology used by ECB.
    - Clarify decision-making and related authority responsibility.
    - Establish more detailed protocols for dispute resolution.
  4. The engagement of external partners such as those organizations with whom ECB has worked (ALNAP, HAP-I, People In Aid, Nethope, etc) should become a formalized element of ECB strategy, particularly to assure outreach to the broader humanitarian community and to dispel impressions of exclusivity. This can be accomplished by:
    - Inclusion of Partners in Project design and planning.
    - Inclusion of Partners in field implementation activities.
    - Inclusion of Partners in Communication planning.
    - The use of formal agreements or MOUs with Partner Organizations.
    - Deliberative planning to build upon activities of other partners and not create parallel structures.
    - Defining indicators of success for each of the above by hosting a joint session to define these indicators.
  5. ECB Project management staff and key agency staff must undertake a more deliberate external communications strategy directed towards awareness raising about emergency capacity and preparedness and sharing of ECB information. The communication strategy should support learning within the Project and learning with external entities. This can be accomplished by:

- Assuring information management at all three critical ECB levels – within IWG agencies, between IWG agencies, and externally.
  - Sponsoring annual low cost “knowledge fairs,” especially in the field (or regionally).
  - Recognizing that there are stages of adaptability, acceptance of ideas and innovations, as well of output of tools (stages of diffusion of innovation - see recommendation 2).
  - Establishing performance indicators for communication activities at all levels.
6. Any planning or design preparation directed towards field implementation activities must include field representation in those processes. This can be accomplished by:
    - Engaging the country directors (and regional directors if necessary), agency staff, and any other key stakeholders in planning and design processes for pilots or expansion of projects.
    - Ensuring there is a mechanism for voice from the beneficiaries themselves in the planning to implementation processes, as well as monitoring and evaluation processes.
  7. ECB management should review personnel employment and assignment procedures to assure transparency and necessary participation. This can be accomplished by:
    - Involving more agency representatives in the recruitment and interviewing of core Project staff.
    - Enhancing the stature and support for the ‘Focal Point’ function (or a successor position) by giving it more authority in financial and project management decision-making, as well as role transparency.
  8. Budgeting and funding allocation procedures should be reviewed for more simplified and streamlined approaches. This could be accomplished by:
    - Providing annual (not quarterly) advances of funds to agencies for Project management expenses even if this means making an exception to one agency’s established funding mechanism.
    - Early budgeting and agreement on pilot project costs, with full amounts transferred to implementing agencies.
    - Involvement of Project management and agency staff in the review of ECB funding procedures, with a view towards revisions that will streamline both ECB and individual agency processes and procedures.
  9. Assure realistic expectations of time and resources that are needed for Project enactment and activities. This can be accomplished by:
    - Initial face-to-face meetings with initiative/objective teams whereby direction, activities, and indicators are mapped out more concretely.
    - Providing for reflection points at periodic stages in project implementation to address issues, modify objectives, and revise activities and workloads if necessary.
    - Allowing flexibility if agency or staff cannot commit to an activity or certain timeline because of other pressures.

10. For continued ECB activities, clearly define measurable outcomes and indicators for the overall goal and objectives as well as for each individual agency in terms of their improved capacity to prepare and respond for emergencies. Refine these goals and objectives to obtainable levels. This can be achieved by:

- Holding an initial strategic workshop with principals and operational staff to define goal(s) and objectives.
- For agency indicators, use examples from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria for evaluation, defining quality, effectiveness, efficiency, coordination, relevance, impact of response, and sustainability as possible means to measure overall impact in emergency responses.
- Draw upon Sphere Project guidance, UNHCR indicators, and other such examples of standards and indicators for overall organization performance in emergencies.
- Draw upon the work of public and private entities who may have established objectives for areas such as collaboration, partnership, and mentoring.